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1. The question of how Schelling conceives the relation of consciousness to the material world may 
be understood in various ways. Some of these, in my view, are well-conceived and others not. We 
may be asking whether there is some problem that Schelling himself formulates and addresses 
which corresponds more or less to the ('hard') problem of consciousness as we understand it (Q1). 
Alternatively we may be asking if any answer can be returned to the question by employing 
Schelling's ideas as a resource (Q2). Both are legitimate. Each reflects a different practice in the 
history of philosophy or different way of relating philosophy to its history. I think the answer to Q1 
is affirmative, but only with heavy qualifications, and once these have been spelled out, it will 
become clear that what Schelling has to say on the topic, as well as being of slight importance in his 
own terms, is of little or no interest to contemporary philosophy of mind. Regarding Q2, I have no 
proposal to make and cannot see much to be done, but the possibility that a contemporary 
philosopher concerned with the metaphysics of mind might find inspiration in Schelling cannot be 
ruled out. What should not be asked is: What is Schelling's solution to the problem of consciousness 
as we understand it (Q3)?, nor even, more cautiously, What solution to the problem of 
consciousness as we understand it can be either found in Schelling or extrapolated from his writings 
on his behalf (Q4)? Both assume ab initio the congruence of Schelling's philosophical project with 
contemporary concerns, an assumption which I will challenge. Had the answer to Q1 been different 
from what it is, Q3 and Q4 would have been cogent, but as it is, they are not. 
 
2. What I have just said raises thorny issues of historical-philosophical methodology, which cannot 
possibly be dealt with here, but are worth brief mention. Strong historicists will object to Q2 on the 
grounds that it credits philosophical reflection with an autonomy, a potential for transcending its 
history, which it does not have. On such a view, found in Dilthey and perhaps Collingwood, Q1 
alone is legitimate, subject to the further condition that 'the problem of consciousness as we 
understand it' is reconstrued as the task of tracing the historical development that has led to our 
present understanding of consciousness as posing a problem. The objection much more likely to be 
voiced, from the other end of the spectrum, is that denying ab initio legitimacy to Q3 and Q4 
assumes that Schelling's agenda of philosophical problems simply cannot even in part be the same 
as, cannot overlap with, our own – an assumption which makes sense only if it is impossible for 
there to be trans-historical topics and objects of philosophical enquiry. Since, however, historical 
self-relativization is not an option for philosophical reflection, there is no alternative but to proceed 
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on the assumption that our present conception of the problem of consciousness is cogent and, 
accordingly, to interrogate philosophers of the past in its light – that is, to endorse Q3 and Q4 ab 
initio. To do so runs no risk of historical insensitivity or anachronism, so long as we are prepared to 
qualify our present-centric interpretations as 'reconstructive' rather than 'strictly historical'. 
 Strong historicism, though absolutely right (in my view) about the importance of viewing 
the philosophical agenda of the present in the perspective of the past, is not attractive. The opposite 
position, by contrast, has considerable appeal. My intention however is not to defend directly any 
general methodological standpoint but to offer Schelling as a case study. If I am right about the 
radical differences of framework and fundamental assumptions which separate Schelling's 
philosophy from contemporary philosophy of mind, then Schelling cannot have a solution to the 
problem of consciousness as we understand it, nor does the notion of a Schellingian solution to it 
extrapolated on his behalf make sense. Had Q3 or Q4 directed our enquiry, this would not have 
been grasped, with the result not only that Schelling would have been misunderstood, but also that 
we would have missed an opportunity to make a valuable gain in philosophical self-knowledge – 
viz., recognition of the live possibility that our way of conceiving consciousness as a problem is 
defective. 
 
3. Much may seem to support a much more positive view, opposed to the line I am taking, of the 
prospects for meshing Schelling with present-day philosophy of mind. A contemporary philosopher 
who happens to come across Schelling's Naturphilosophie – the conception of Nature and natural 
science which Schelling first presented in 1797 and continued to elaborate until roughly 1804,1 and 
which defined an entire research programme for his generation – may well consider that here, at 
long last, classical German philosophy exhibits some degree of attunement to the concerns of the 
present -day philosophy. Schelling seeks to tell a unified philosophical story which will allow us to 
regard consciousness and indeed self-consciousness as the final product of a single continuous 
development running up from the elementary forces of physics, via organic nature, to man as a 
rational being.2 Schelling remains alien in several respects, not least in his rejection of mechanistic 
causality and the scientific ideal of mathematical exactitude, but there would appear to be full 
recognition on his part that rational consciousness must be set within and not beyond Nature, in 
direct contradiction with the subjective idealism of Kant and Fichte. In addition, in so far as he may 
seem to follow Spinoza in denying that anything stands above Nature,3 Schelling ought, arguably, 
to appear more congenial than Hegel, who also allows to run up to man as nature's product, but on 
the basis of a metaphysics of spirit that may be thought to make his Philosophy of Nature 
incompatible with even the weakest contemporary naturalism. 
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 The arguable relevance of Schelling to contemporary philosophy lies, therefore, in his 
having apparently rediscovered the truth of naturalism from within the context of Kantian 
subjectivism, without reverting to the materialism of early moderns such as Hobbes, la Mettrie, or 
(many allege) Spinoza: to the contrary, Schelling preserves from his Kantian-Fichtean heritage the 
insight which is needed in order to grasp the hard problem of consciousness, the refined 
appreciation of subjectivity that makes Spinoza and Leibniz seem in Kantian retrospect somewhat 
clumsy in their dealings with the mind. Schelling thus appears (promisingly) poised between 
naturalism's mature and responsible recognition of the authority of the natural sciences for 
philosophical reflection, and the dualist's appreciation of the a priori distinctiveness of conscious 
mentality. The details of Schelling's metaphysics of mind and account of the mind-body relation are 
another matter, and for reasons already given it would be foolish to expect to find in him a clear 
anticipation of any of the possibilities explored in contemporary philosophy of mind, but in broad 
terms – and irrespective of whether anything might be extracted from Schelling to enrich 
contemporary philosophy of mind – it would seem that he may be considered an ally of sorts, a co-
participant in the modern endeavour to find an intelligible metaphysical locus for the phenomenon 
of consciousness in a natural world cleansed of Aristotelian and other pre-modern fictions. Some 
may go further and argue that Schelling lends his weight to the 'panpsychist' solution to the problem 
of consciousness.4 
 
4. This construal of Schelling is in my estimate, as I have indicated, headed entirely in the wrong 
direction. The foregoing characterizations of Schelling's Naturphilosophie are all correct – or at 
least not incorrect – in so far as Schelling does indeed tell us that mind, though irreducible, emerges 
(in some sense) from matter in consequence of the nature of the latter, and that mind is conditional 
(in some sense) upon our embodiment and our position in the order of living beings; Schelling is 
indeed (in some sense) a non-reductionist and emergentist who believes that the totality of mind and 
matter is cognitively accessible and inherently intelligible. Everything turns, however, on the 
unpacking of 'in some sense', and when the naturphilosophisch tenets cited above are restored to 
their proper context – the broader standpoint within which Schelling developed Naturphilosophie 
and which becomes clearly visible when his philosophical development is viewed in its entirety – 
Schelling's position assumes a quite different aspect. 
 The connection as such of mind and matter – still less the hard problem of consciousness – 
is quite simply not a primary or self-standing philosophical problem for Schelling. Once a complete 
solution to the problems that properly determine systematic philosophical reflection has been 
discovered, no such problem remains. The problems that per Schelling define the task of philosophy 
are (1) the derivation of the finite, determinate, objectual world from the absolute, (2) the relation 
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between the two domains into which the absolute cleaves primordially, viz., the subjective (or 
'ideal') and the objective (or 'real'), and (3) the nature and reality of freedom. These are conceived 
by Schelling in terms that abstract from individuated human existence: questions of epistemology 
and human freedom which are indexed to individual subjects of self-consciousness (are my 
knowledge claims justified? do I meet the conditions of responsibility for my actions?) are 
subordinate to their impersonal counterparts (how can the subjective-ideal relate in the modes of 
cognition and causality to the objective-real? where and in what forms is Freedom expressed in 
Nature?). Naturphilosophie is part, but only a part, of the solution of (1)–(3): it tells us how Nature 
must be conceived in order for it to derive from the absolute and for scientific theories of natural 
phenomena to be genuinely explanatory – namely as 'autonomous', 'autarchic', and possessing 
'unconditioned reality'.5 And when Nature has been made rationally transparent – shown to be 
structured in accordance with fundamental principles derived from the absolute, and to culminate in 
rational consciousness – still nothing has been revealed within it that bears specifically on our 
contemporary problem of relating consciousness to its neural base. For Schelling this relation is no 
explanandum but merely a further instance of the original duality which furnishes the entire 
structure of Nature itself and finds itself repeated itself at every level, in every natural product: light 
and gravity, heat and electricity, the sun and the Earth, the morphology of plant and animal species, 
all of these are to be understood as magnet-like bipolar syntheses of opposed principles, 
distinguished by their internal structure and relation to one another.6 There are specific things to be 
said about sensation (and 'qualitative experience') as a phenomenon in the Stufenfolge of Nature and 
as a component of human cognition,7 and about the brain as an organ,8 but they cannot bear on the 
'hard problem of consciousness': at a point where they arise for consideration, the mind-body 
relation has already been accounted for, as implied in the very possibility of a world, and thus as 
something not to be sought within it.9 
 
5. The full account of how Schelling arrives at this position is another (and lengthy) story, but we 
catch a glimpse of its motivation by noting how Schelling has accepted and developed further two 
lessons of Kant's: demotion of the mind-body problem from the position of pre-eminence that it 
occupies in early modern philosophy, and its supplanting by the new problem of Freedom and 
Nature. The first belongs to the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant explains that the soul-matter 
problem of the early moderns, which called forth such hypotheses as physical influx and pre-
established harmony, has been overtaken by the metaphysics of transcendental idealism, which 
specifies the a priori principles of interconnection of 'inner' and 'outer appearances', i.e. mental 
states and things in space. All further questions are consigned to the realm of the 'problematic'; to 
find the mind-body relation puzzling, Kant argues, is to mistake its relata for things in themselves.10 
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The possibility that Kant leaves open – that mind and matter share a supersensible ground which is 
not of the nature of either – Schelling embraces, converting Kantian ignorance into positive 
cognition: we have according to Schelling immediate knowledge in intellectual intuition of the 
absolute as ground and identity ('absolute indifference') of the subjective and objective. The second 
lesson comes from the Critique of the Power of Judgement, where Kant takes up the task of 
restoring continuity between our thought about the order of nature and the moral order which reason 
prescribes for freedom.11 Here too Kant's solution consists in an interconnection of subjective a 
priori principles, which Schelling again ontologizes, according unconditioned reality to what Kant 
had left problematic: the absolute as 'indifference point' of the subjective and objective is also the 
ground and identity of Freedom and Nature. 
 The details of these moves and their putative justification are not important for present 
purposes, the essential point being that Schelling takes Kant's ground-breaking reconfiguration of 
the early modern agenda – Kant's replacement of questions concerning substance and essence into 
questions concerning the logic of the subject-object relation, and the interrelations of principles in 
rational self-consciousness – and transposes it into a metaphysical structure. Kantian principles of 
self-consciousness thought become the principles that constitute reality as it is in itself. 
 
6. Having shown how Q1 is to be answered, it is a fairly straightforward matter to reconstruct 
Schelling's attitude to the contemporary hard problem of consciousness.  
 The philosopher who holds up 'brain states' and 'subjective mental processes' and asks how 
these two isolated things can be related to one another, is engaged in a nonsensical enterprise – as if 
a philosopher sought to answer the question how mathematics can have application a priori  to the 
physical world by contemplating two apples and asking where in the properties of the apples their 
relation to the number 2 is located. The hard question of consciousness is arrived at by stripping 
away the perspective of the I on sensation, as if the distinction of 'sheer qualitative consciousness' 
from I-thinking reflexive consciousness were a real and not merely a formal distinction. The 
contemporary philosopher of mind may retort that animality shows the distinction to be real, and 
Schelling will reply that the mistake has just been repeated: animality has been torn out of its proper 
context and posited as metaphysically and explanatorily independent of the total order of Nature 
within which alone it is intelligible. 
 The exponent of Schelling's standpoint may press the point by raising a question about the 
hard problem of consciousness which, though absolutely basic, or perhaps for that very reason, is 
rarely considered. In every statement of the problem, essential use is made of some such expression 
as 'subjectively given', 'immediately presented', 'inwardly accessible', 'endowed with a first-person 
aspect', and so forth. Now the primary meaning of all these phrases is in a broad sense epistemic: 
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they refer not to the intrinsic constitution of any set of items but to our mode of access to them. 
(Thus the hard problem of consciousness, in its initial formulation, is not equivalent to the general 
non-epistemic problem of how, if at all, the physicist's world of mathematically determinable 
quantities can support qualitative features.) The question is therefore: Why attach importance – any 
importance, of a philosophical kind – to that mode of access? Why suppose that it matters what is 
and isn't accessible to 'immediate inward presentation'? (It matters no doubt for epistemology, but 
the justification and rational reconstruction of cognitive claims are not the present issue.) The 
answer cannot be: 'Because we are the very beings who have that mode of access' – since that 
question merely raises another: Why suppose that beings of our kind are such that it is of 
metaphysical significance what does and doesn't show up in what we, animals of a certain species, 
call our 'inner perspective'? Nor can it be: 'Because the mode of access is constitutive of the items in 
question' – which again merely begs the question why this particular instance of an item's being 
part-constituted by a relation should be regarded as metaphysically distinctive. (That this mode of 
access leads us to conceptualize the items to which it leads in a distinctive way is indisputable but 
irrelevant, for it is exactly that connection – the assumption that modes of access are of more-than-
epistemic significance – which needs grounding.) The dialectic will run and run, but at some point – 
this is what the Schellingian maieutic aims to reveal by estranging us from what of course seems 
utterly self-evident – the philosopher of mind will have to simply turn her spade and avow a 
baseline commitment to the notion that the distinction of consciousness and its contents from other 
things must go deeper, must carry more metaphysical meaning, than the distinction of quarks from 
bosons or of reptiles from mammals, and that the fact that we understand it as a unique distinction, 
not an instance of a more general type of distinction within Nature, is rightfully taken as no mere 
contingency, attributable to the narrow angle of vision which conditions our conceptualizations. To 
say this, however, is to make implicit appeal to a higher, hitherto unavowed standpoint, which 
cannot be allowed to remain indeterminate.12 The basis of this standpoint – presupposed by the 
claims to positive metaphysical knowledge which are needed to formulate the 'hard problem of 
consciousness' – is exactly what Schelling seeks to articulate in his theory of the absolute. And 
because he constructs this theory by transposing concepts from an idealism (Kant and Fichte's) 
which gives primacy to rational self-conscious subjectivity – allowing Nature to be understood as 
an expression and realization of the laws of our mind, 'mind made visible'13 – no puzzle or problem 
concerning the justification for attaching metaphysical significance to mental concepts can arise for 
Schelling, as it inevitably does for contemporary philosophers. 
 The situation of the modern philosopher of mind should be understood in historical terms. 
Various decisions made at the inception of analytic philosophy cut it loose from the major currents 
of nineteenth-century philosophy – all of which, it is plausible to contend, were in one way or 
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another descendants of classical German philosophy, either pursuing its agenda in modified ways 
or, at the very least, formed in reaction against its legacy, seeking to correct its idealism, apriorism, 
etc. The quarrels with Bradley in the early analytic literature merely served to draw a line under the 
philosophical past, over which nothing was to be carried into the present, and the idea that the 
overarching task of philosophy is determined, as Kant maintained in the Third Critique, by certain 
aboriginal interlocking dualisms – of reason and sense, Freedom and Nature, and so on – 
disappeared from view. The growth of philosophy of mind as a central area of philosophy is a major 
chapter in the story of analytic philosophy's relaxation of its methodology and expansion of its 
problem-agenda, and it is fair to say that it has come to be regarded as the decisive high-level battle-
field in the argument of (for want of a better word) humanism with (what it perceives as) scientism. 
The peculiarity of the present situation lies in the intention to determine whether minds are 'more 
than' neural states of organisms without recourse to general metaphysics, assisted only (for some) 
by cognitive psychology and brain science – as if Huxley and Bishop Wilberforce agreed to decide 
the issue between them through consideration of the latest results in vertebrate palaeontology. 
 What makes Schelling irrelevant to the philosopher of mind, and simultaneously makes the 
so-called 'hard problem of consciousness' inconsequential in Schelling's eyes, is therefore a 
consequence of the fact that Kant's paradigm-shifting reconfiguration of the philosophical agenda, 
whose stamp is borne by classical German philosophy and all its legatees, has been reversed: the 
mind-body problem has returned to centre stage, with the difference that it is now dissociated from 
the theistic (and associated broader metaphysical) concerns of the early moderns – meaning in 
effect (by virtue of what contemporary treatment of the problem excludes) that it has become an 
issue that must be solved, if at all, on empiricist terms. The hegemony of empiricism is reflected in 
the three characteristically empiricist mistakes that, in Schelling's view, the philosopher occupied 
with the hard problem of consciousness makes: the mistake of looking for the key to the relation of 
brain and consciousness or of mind and matter within the world, as if it could be an empirical 
matter; the mistake of atomism, of supposing that items which experience may seem to present as 
'simples' can be taken as given elements out of which the complex and more puzzling constituents 
of reality are constructed; and the axiological mistake of anti-humanism, in so far as the human 
subject is conceived as needing to appeal to something as etiolated and conceptually void as 
evanescent qualitative consciousness in order to lay claim to any of the metaphysical privileges that 
were regarded once upon a time as, quite literally, the gift of God, and that classical German 
philosophy sought to reinstate in a defensibly modern, God-independent form. With these 
assumptions in place, the problem of consciousness is neither soluble nor worth solving – its 
insolubility signifies no triumph for humanism over hard naturalism, since the irreducibility of 
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'qualia' is, in the terms that prevail, a fact without any metaphysical meaning. In this confused and 
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